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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3855 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT WILLIAMS, a/k/a Bashir a/k/a Bash 
 
 
Robert Williams, 
                        Appellant 
 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-07-cr-00737-014 
District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
ROSENTHAL, District Judge
*
 
 
 
                                                 
     
*
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge for the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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(Filed: September 17, 2012) 
        
 
                       
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
  
A jury convicted Robert Williams of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
distributing cocaine, and the District Court sentenced him to 300 months 
imprisonment.  Williams appeals his conviction and sentence.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 On August 6, 2008, Williams was indicted and charged with, inter alia, 
conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of 
crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (“Count 
1”) and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (“Count 4”).  The government alleged that Kareem Smith 
was the head of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine in parts of 
Philadelphia and Cecil County, Maryland from November 2002 through 
September 2007 (referred to in the Indictment as the Smith Crack Cocaine Gang or 
“SCCG”).  It further alleged that Williams was a co-conspirator whose role was to 
supply cocaine to the SCCG. 
 On June 2, 2009, following a jury trial, Williams was convicted on Counts 1 
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and 4.  On September 14, 2009, Williams filed a motion for judgment of acquittal 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).  On March 10, 2010, the 
District Court denied Williams’ motion. 
 On June 28, 2010, the District Court held a hearing as to the quantity of 
drugs that should be attributed to Williams and his co-defendants at sentencing.  
On July 16, 2010, the District Court issued an order as to the drug weight 
attribution and established the applicable sentencing guidelines for Williams and 
his co-defendants. 
 On September 13, 2010, the District Court imposed a sentence on Williams 
of 300 months imprisonment to be followed by an 5-year period of supervised 
release, along with a $2,000 fine and a $200 special assessment. 
 Williams appealed his conviction and sentence.
1
 
II. 
A. 
 Williams argues that, although he was a drug dealer and may have sold 
cocaine to members of the SCCG on a periodic basis, those sales were made as 
part of a standard buyer-seller relationship, and thus, the evidence was insufficient 
to prove that he joined the SCCG. 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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We review a challenge to the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de 
novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.  United 
States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2006).   We must sustain the verdict if 
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  It is 
immaterial that the evidence also permits a “less sinister conclusion” because “the 
evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt.”  United 
States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  In sum, the verdict must stand unless the insufficiency of the evidence is 
clear.  United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 The elements of a conspiracy charge under § 846 are: (1) a unity of purpose 
between the alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) 
an agreement to work together toward that goal.  See United States v. Iglesias, 535 
F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008). 
In United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1999), we addressed 
the issue of the scope of conspiracy liability for a defendant whose sole 
involvement with the conspiracy consisted of buying drugs from another member 
of the conspiracy and reselling those drugs to others.  “It is well-settled that a 
simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or contemporaneous 
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understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the 
buyer was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.”  Id. at 197.  However, even an 
occasional supplier or buyer for redistribution could be shown to be a member of 
the conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge that he was part of a 
larger operation.  See id. at 198.  Where the only evidence linking the seller or 
buyer to the conspiracy is the transactions themselves, courts look to the 
surrounding circumstances to determine whether the defendant was a mere seller or 
buyer that cannot be held to be a conspirator or whether he has “knowledge of the 
conspiracy to the extent that his drug [sales] or purchases are circumstantial 
evidence of his intent to join that conspiracy.”  Id.  When making this 
determination, courts generally consider the following factors: how long the 
defendant was affiliated with the conspiracy; whether there was an established 
method of payment; the extent to which transactions were standardized; whether 
the actions of the defendant and members of the conspiracy demonstrated a level of 
mutual trust; whether the transactions involved a large amount of drugs; and 
whether the buyer purchased the drugs on credit.  Id. at 199. 
 A reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, sufficiently demonstrates Williams’ participation in 
the SCCG.  This evidence includes that: Smith and other members of the SCCG 
regularly contacted Williams during a five-year period, during which time 
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Williams supplied large amounts of cocaine to the group (Supp. App. 224-26, 535-
38, 540, 558-59); members of the SCCG informed Williams of their operational 
plans, including that that they could sell crack in Maryland for four times the price 
it was in Philadelphia (Supp. App. 574-75, 592-93); Smith sent Williams to sell 
cocaine on behalf of the SCCG to one of Smith’s acquaintances, who — 
unbeknownst to Smith or Williams — was a confidential informant (Supp. App. 
385-402, 652-60); case agent John Bowman testified regarding phone records 
showing extensive phone communications between Williams and Smith (Supp. 
App. 898-936); and on at least one occasion, Williams supplied Smith with cocaine 
as a gift to get Smith back on his feet after his release from jail (Supp. App. 605-
07).
2
  Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that Williams was a 
member of the SCCG.   
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying Williams’ Rule 29 
motion for judgment of acquittal.    
                                                 
2 
Williams argues that he, like the defendant in United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144 
(3d Cir. 2001), never agreed to work with either his seller or his buyers to achieve a 
common goal or advance a common interest.  However, Pressler is inapposite for 
primarily two reasons.  First, the issue in Pressler was whether a conspiracy existed at all, 
not whether a particular individual was a member of a documented conspiracy.  See Id. at 
147, 151 (distinguishing Gibbs because the issue in Pressler was whether a conspiracy 
existed).  Second, the evidence demonstrates that Williams, unlike the defendant in 
Pressler, was so closely connected with the conspiracy that a reasonable jury could infer 
he shared a unity of purpose with — and joined — the SCCG with the intent to further its 
common goals.     
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B. 
 We review the District Court’s determination as to the amount of drugs 
attributed to a defendant for clear error.  United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 322 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
When sentencing co-conspirators, the sentencing court may consider “all 
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2008) (Williams was 
sentenced under the 2008 version of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual).  As to 
offenses involving controlled substances, a “defendant is accountable for all 
quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a 
jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of 
contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly 
undertook.”  See id. cmt. n.2.  We have held that, under § 1B1.3, a defendant can 
be responsible for the amount of drugs distributed by his co-conspirators only if the 
drugs distributed: (1) were in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) were within the 
scope of the defendant’s agreement; and (3) were reasonably foreseeable in 
connection with the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to undertake.  See 
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 732 (3d Cir. 1994).  When determining the 
amount of drugs attributable to a particular defendant, the sentencing court must 
conduct a “searching and individualized inquiry,” United States v. Collado, 975 
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F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir. 1992), and may rely upon trial testimony of co-conspirators, 
Price, 13 F.3d at 732.   
Here, the District Court — after a careful and thorough consideration of the 
issue, which included a hearing addressing the issues of, inter alia, the length of 
participation in the conspiracy and the drug weight attribution as to each defendant 
— did not plainly err in determining that Williams was responsible for conspiring 
to distribute 59.1 kilograms of crack cocaine.  First, the District Court determined 
that Williams was a member of the SCCG from its beginning (November 2002) to 
its end (September 2007), and thus, he was involved for 58 months, which 
conservatively equates to 232 weeks.  Smith’s trial testimony supported this 
determination.  See Supp. App. 558-59 (testifying that Williams supplied the 
SCCG with cocaine from 2002 to 2007).  Second, the District Court determined 
that the SCCG distributed approximately 9 ounces of crack per week, which is 
equal to approximately 255 grams.  This conservative determination was supported 
by the trial testimony, in particular Smith’s testimony that he was obtaining 
approximately 9 ounces of cocaine multiple times a week from his suppliers at the 
beginning of the conspiracy (Supp. App. 540) and that this amount increased to 
between 9 to 13.5 ounces later in the conspiracy (Supp. App. 550-51).  Moreover, 
the trial testimony also indicates that Williams knew, or that it was reasonably 
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foreseeable, that others were supplying cocaine to the SCCG.
3
  Thus, the District 
Court did not plainly err in concluding that Williams was responsible for 0.255 
kilograms of crack per week multiplied by 232 weeks, totaling 59.1 kilograms of 
crack. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
                                                 
3
 As discussed supra, the evidence at trial demonstrates that Williams was closely 
involved with the SCCG’s operations and understood the conspiracy’s scope.  Thus, 
Williams knew — or reasonably should have known — that his supply of cocaine to the 
SCCG was insufficient to cover its operating needs and that the SCCG used an additional 
supplier.  Also, the amount of cocaine provided by suppliers other than Williams to the 
SCCG was within the scope of Williams’ agreement to join the conspiracy because that 
amount allowed the SCCG to continue operating and potentially expand its market share 
even when Williams temporarily exhausted his supply. 
 Moreover, we are not persuaded by Williams’ argument that the amount of crack 
cocaine for which he is responsible should be reduced on account of his incarceration 
from July through November 2004 because that amount does not affect his sentencing 
guideline range.  The District Court determined that Williams was responsible for 
conspiring to distribute 59.1 kilograms of crack, which resulted in the highest base 
offense level of 38 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2008) (his total offense level was 40 
because it included a two point enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for a dangerous 
weapon).  Williams was incarcerated for 16 weeks, during which the District Court 
estimated that the SCCG distributed 4.08 kilograms of crack (i.e., 0.255 kilograms of 
crack per week multiplied by 16 weeks).  If we were to reduce the total amount found by 
the District Court (59.1 kilograms) by the 4.08 kilograms that the SCCG distributed while 
Williams was in jail, Williams would be responsible for approximately 55 kilograms of 
crack.  This amount is still well above the 4.5 kilogram threshold that corresponds with 
the base offense level of 38 as set forth in § 2D1.1(c)(1) of the applicable 2008 version of 
the Guidelines Manual.  Consequently, even if Williams were not responsible for the 
crack the SCCG sold during his period of incarceration, his offense level, and thus his 
sentencing guidelines range, would remain unaffected.           
